




How Revolutionary was Revolutionary Justice?
Legal Culture in Russia across the Revolutionary Divide

On 24 November 1917, the Bolsheviks published their vision for a new justice system. Abolishing all existing courts, they established local (later people’s) courts for crimes such as murder, theft and civil disputes, and revolutionary tribunals to combat threatening ‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes such as plots, revolts and sabotage. Both courts were instructed to rely on existing laws only insofar as they did not contradict new decrees or party programmes, and to use revolutionary consciousness to reach a verdict.​[1]​ Through this and subsequent decrees, the Bolsheviks intended to create a new legal culture for the revolutionary state.
The concept of legal culture is a contested one among scholars, but it originated from a desire to move the understanding of law away from a narrow focus on ‘the set of rules or norms, written or unwritten, about right and wrong behaviour, duties and rights’ to a broader ‘social study’ of law that incorporated the social and legal forces that make law, the structures and rules of law itself, and the impact of law on wider behaviour.​[2]​ This includes ‘what people think about law, lawyers and the legal order’ and ‘ideas, attitudes, opinions and expectations with regard to the legal system’.​[3]​ This broad coverage, as critics have pointed out, undermines legal culture as an analytical and comparative tool, but it retains value as a means of ‘assessing important but indeterminate matters’; namely, the ‘general environment of thought, belief, practices and institutions’ within which law existed.​[4]​ By this definition, changing Russia’s legal culture encapsulated Bolshevik ambitions; they did not simply want to alter laws, they wanted to change the relationship between law and the state, and how individuals thought about the legal system and their interactions with it.
Accordingly, Bolshevik legal theorists paid little attention initially to formal laws and punishments. Instead, they focused on repositioning the relationship between law and society. Where the legal system had been an oppressive arm of the exploitative, bourgeois state, it would now support the working classes, protect them from enemies, and form the foundation of a new, proletarian state. It would achieve this through judges who no longer required legal training being chosen by popularly-elected soviets and through mass involvement in the legal process (ordinary people serving in place of lawyers and the audience having a say in sentencing). Law would no longer serve to repress the people, because the legal system would be inseparable from society. Precise definitions of crimes and punishments were unnecessary since the working classes were fully capable of deciding what was a crime and an appropriate level of punishment. This participation would educate people in the mentality and behaviour expected of a conscientious soviet citizen. The Bolsheviks saw this as ‘revolutionary justice’; a radically different legal culture to reflect and serve the Russian Revolution.
But how revolutionary was this new system of revolutionary justice? Bolsheviks painted a picture of polar opposites: legal culture in the oppressive tsarist state versus legal culture in a liberated proletarian state.​[5]​ P. I. Stuchka, legal theorist and Commissar of Justice in 1918, boasted in 1919 that the revolution had cast all sixteen volumes of the code of laws of the Russian empire on the bonfire, along with the empire itself. He then argued in 1922 that the ‘revolution in law’ had been even more ‘revolutionary’ in deeds than words. He pointed out that both revolutionary courts had been formed and former laws abolished before decrees had officially sanctioned either act.​[6]​ The Bolsheviks’ enemies agreed, albeit negatively rather than positively, arguing that elected judges and revolutionary consciousness fostered lawlessness not legal order.​[7]​ This sense of October 1917 as a dividing line was subsequently adopted by many legal historians, whether in Russia or the West.​[8]​
Yet at the end of his article in 1922, Stuchka cast doubt on the durability of the revolutionary changes he had earlier described. The New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 marked a retreat towards capitalism in many respects, which coincided with and facilitated the growing complexity of legal organs and procedure, culminating in the publication of new law codes in 1922. Stuchka denied this was a return to the pre-1917 system, instead talking of a ‘strictly controlled retreat’ to preserve the ‘victorious’ revolution, whilst urging the revolution in law to continue to safeguard against a return to the past. But these new developments had undoubtedly drawn on elements of the past and, as Stuchka himself had admitted in 1919, ‘every borrowing leads to conscious or unconscious counter-revolution’.​[9]​
The idea of a clear break in 1917 has also been questioned subsequently, with some scholars noting similarities between the Soviet legal system and its tsarist predecessor, from the position and politicization of law in an authoritarian state, to statutes, lawyers and the role of tradition.​[10]​ There are, though, few systematic studies,​[11]​ and none of these were interested in broader legal culture or able to take advantage of recent works that have used archives to explore the everyday activities of courts on either side of 1917.​[12]​ They do, however, also suggest the importance of elements of continuity amid major change. Even a recent work championing the ‘revolutionary’ impact of Soviet law on Western law admitted that for all its innovation, Soviet law remained within the legal tradition inherited by the new government. Indeed, it was this continuity, the author speculated, that may have enabled Soviet law to pose a ‘potent’ challenge to Western law; it was similar enough to be recognizable and acceptable, yet sufficiently innovative to push Western law in ‘uncharted directions’.​[13]​ 
Whilst not subscribing to the innovative nature of Soviet law in the same way or examining its impact on the West, this study argues that it was impossible to discard all former laws, institutions and practices, and that there was not just continuity but that elements of this continuity both influenced and constrained Bolshevik policies. Through an exploration of two key elements of Bolshevik legal culture – the relationship between statutory law and revolutionary consciousness, and society’s relationship with the courtroom – it makes two related arguments. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks recognized continuity was as important as change in enabling legal institutions to project state power and engage with the population, and thus consciously incorporated elements of existing legal culture into their new legal system. On the other, the Bolsheviks were unable to implement some changes (and retreated from others) for the same reasons, finding their actions constrained by the persistence of former practices and beliefs. As in other spheres, the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary dreams often had to take a back seat to the realities of a fledgling state struggling to survive.

Revolutionary Consciousness versus Statutory Law

Revolutionary justice attempted an uneasy balancing act between the new and the existing from the start with respect to statutory (or written) law. An early draft of the November 1917 decree proposed to abolish the laws of ‘overthrown governments’,​[14]​ but, as noted, the final version avoided this; instead, courts could use them as long as they did not contradict new decrees, socialist party programmes or revolutionary consciousness (soznanie). The continued use of tsarist-era laws was reaffirmed in the second decree on courts on 7 March 1918 and was not mentioned in the third decree on 20 July. It was not until 30 November 1918 that new regulations on people’s courts explicitly prohibited the use of former laws, instructing courts to rely solely on new decrees and ‘socialist legal consciousness’.​[15]​
Apparently, opposition to the idea of ‘lawlessness’ from within the Bolshevik party and the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets (VTsIK) forced initial compromises. Opponents wanted new laws in place before old ones were abolished, forcing a ‘softening’ of the words.​[16]​ But there were practical benefits. The November 1917 decree was only the start of a long process. In Moscow province, for instance, some uezd authorities were still discussing the importance of new courts in establishing Bolshevik power and engaging the masses in mid-December, whilst a meeting of uezd commissars in early January revealed that a provincial department of justice was still being established, new courts were still needed in towns and volosti, and instructions had to be issued. To hasten the process, commissars focused on how existing courts and personnel could be adapted and utilized, yet by April 1918 only half of the province’s uezdy had a court structure along the lines proposed in November.​[17]​ Other reports and memoirs make it clear that Moscow was far from atypical. Many remote areas took longer, former courts still existed well into 1918, and their administrative structure, cases and personnel were often adopted by new courts. Against this background, preserving existing laws ensured a degree of legitimacy for new courts and provided guidance for those working in them. Yet justice officials soon became concerned that these courts were insufficiently revolutionary; they were concentrating on the wrong crimes, and dispensing incorrect and lenient sentences given the threats facing the revolution.​[18]​ The state needed to draw a clearer line between revolutionary justice and tsarist-era practices, and emphasizing ‘revolutionary’ or ‘socialist’ consciousness over statutory law seemed to offer a quick way to a sharp break.
The Bolsheviks did not define ‘revolutionary consciousness’, but seem to have meant the experiences, views and intuition of the ordinary, ‘class conscious’ workers and peasants who had made the revolution and now supposedly staffed the judicial system; these groups would be aware of their class interests, the interests of the revolution, and thus the interests of the Bolsheviks who saw themselves as the legitimate representatives of the revolution. But, as one scholar noted, these experiences and views, and the understanding of justice emerging from them, could not have come solely from the revolution. People do not entirely reshape their views overnight.​[19]​ Thus, rather than being completely new, revolutionary consciousness was entwined with popular understandings of law and justice that had existed for centuries, or in other words, was a revolutionary version of longstanding elements of customary law (that is, law derived from customs and practices rather than from written statutes).
After all, the tsarist legal system was itself far from objective. A recent study on early modern Russia has emphasized that judges made their decisions partly by following statutory law and official state directives, and partly by being sensitive to local community norms and opinions.​[20]​ After 1864, Russia moved towards a western-style system; a coherent set of laws enforced through a tightly-regulated system of independent public courts staffed by legally-educated and trained professionals alongside a jury, with the judge mediating between the prosecution and the defence.​[21]​ Yet subjective factors – the circumstances of individual cases, the characters and consciousness of those involved in the case, and local customs – continued to play an important role.
Juries were primarily composed of peasants, particularly beyond St Petersburg and Moscow, or the urban working and lower middle classes, and almost half were illiterate. They usually reached verdicts on the basis of accepted ‘norms’ of behaviour (seemingly influenced more by custom, personal circumstances and experiences, press accounts of crime, and even crime fiction than by official statutes), sympathy for the accused, suspicion of the prosecution, and particular beliefs and expectations in the legal system, not least the misguided belief that the state would impose harsher penalties on the accused than it did. The arguments of lawyers only encouraged this in many trials as lawyers urged jurors to follow their consciences, and often privileged theatricality and style over substance and legal arguments.​[22]​
Moreover, the reformed tsarist legal system utilized customary law officially in some areas before 1917. On the one hand, courts presided over by justices of the peace existed in urban areas, which dealt quickly and informally with common, petty crimes (such as theft) and civil disputes. Applying the perceived fairness of custom to the authority of statutes, they aimed to make the legal process understandable and desirable.​[23]​ On the other hand, district or volost’ courts existed in the countryside, which were run by peasants with verdicts dispensed by three to four elected peasant judges (who did not require previous legal experience). No lawyers or jury were present, but peasants tended to see the panel of local figures who served as judges as a ‘jury’. Judges were told to decide cases ‘according to conscience, on the basis of evidence contained in the case’; criminal cases tended to pay more attention to written statutes, whereas civil cases relied more on custom. Judges took the character and reputations of those involved seriously, including witnesses, assigning greater weight to those deemed honest, law-abiding and hard-working, with village observations, opinions and rumours all playing a role. The sincerity of any repentance on the part of the defendant was also important in influencing the final judgement. All this meant that different outcomes were possible for similar crimes, where factors such as drunkenness could be viewed as a mitigating or an aggravating factor depending on the individual defendant or judge.​[24]​ It also meant that, more broadly, crime was not considered separate from the personality and life of the accused.
	It would be surprising if these traditions of assessing cases according to conscience did not inform revolutionary consciousness, particularly given a transition process that saw many volost’ courts simply renamed as people’s courts, and the fact that judges were often far from the class-conscious, Bolshevik-sympathizing figures that the Bolsheviks had intended. There has been no prosopographical analysis of judges after October 1917 beyond general characteristics: most were peasants; the majority only had rudimentary education; very few had any legal education; and whilst judges in provincial courts were usually party members, this number was much lower locally.​[25]​ The most politicized courts were revolutionary tribunals. In late 1920, a report on tribunals across the railway network noted that all tribunal chairmen should have three years experience of party work. Of the twenty-three tribunals surveyed, only two failed to meet these criteria.​[26]​ Other tribunals, however, did not fare so well; almost all judges were party members, but usually recent recruits, joining after the October Revolution. Most were in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties, from peasant backgrounds and had only basic education. For the vast majority, their only experience of legal work had come since their appointment to the tribunal.​[27]​ Party membership, moreover, was no guarantee of ability or of sufficient class consciousness in any court. Courts faced a constant struggle through the civil war and beyond to find sufficient numbers of efficient and reliable personnel and to retain them as better rewarded, more prestigious posts were available for capable people elsewhere. In the late 1920s, there remained an annual turnover of 24% as the best continued to be poached and the worst had to be removed.​[28]​
	These judges continued to place crimes firmly within a broader social and personal context, even if they utilized new, class-based terminology. Looking at trial transcripts from Moscow’s tribunal across 1918-20, for example, it is possible to see certain patterns emerging. Judges were concerned with the defendant’s background, from age, education, and family life, to occupation and membership of professional organs. The revolution’s influence can be seen in their frequent interest in a defendant’s property and capital before and after October as a marker of class and social position. Defendants also often used their final words to stress pertinent aspects of their biography.​[29]​ Transcripts from transport tribunals in Moscow and the Northern regions are briefer, but the judges responded more favourably to younger defendants accused of their first crime who could prove useful to the state if rehabilitated, as well as those from lower social classes, usually described as possessing a ‘low cultural level’ and deemed to not to realise the consequences of their actions. Others received lighter sentences based on their ‘sincere’ confession or repentance. Judges were harsher on officials and party members, and those in other positions of authority, as these individuals should have known better.​[30]​ Similarly, ‘insincere’ explanations were treated harshly. One deserter argued that he was needed back home to work the fields, but the court noted that he deserted in the winter when there was no work to be done!​[31]​
	Revolutionary consciousness, therefore, as practised by courts, was deeply rooted in pre-revolutionary consciousness. Bolshevik theorists, of course, did not publicly recognize this link, instead attributing the importance placed on circumstances to new, revolutionary conceptions of crime. Crime itself was seen to have a limited lifespan as the advent of socialism would remove its causes; in the meantime, crime was the manifestation of the remnants of former practices and mentalities, of a primitive consciousness, and of not just a criminal’s personality but their socio-economic background. Some theorists did not even use the word ‘crime’, preferring to talk of a ‘socially harmful’ act that required a ‘penalty’ rather than punishment. All criminals, they argued, were capable of reconstruction, but the likelihood of success depended on social background, whilst securing society’s defence was more about removing harmful broader social factors.​[32]​ Yet even these ideas, as revolutionary as they seemed to contemporaries, had their roots in scientific debates on psychopathology, moral contagion and criminality conducted by liberals prior to 1917.​[33]​
Nevertheless, revolutionary consciousness, and the need to re-educate and rehabilitate rather than simply punish, was used to justify courts dispensing a wider range of sentences than had been practised before 1917. Most volost’ courts, for instance, had dispensed either relatively short prison sentences or monetary fines. Other tsarist courts could dispense harsher penalties, including exile and death. Bolshevik courts, though, added forced public labour and public censure to this list, experimented with suspended sentences and substituting property for monetary crimes, and sent people to different types of prisons. In addition, most statistics include a further category for other punishments, most of which remained unspecified but could involve a significant variety of sentences. Even tribunals, after outlining the severity of a defendant’s crimes against the state often reached a verdict of simple public censure, which usually seems to have meant condemnation of the person and their crime, which was then often reported in the local press.​[34]​ Some of this variety was forced upon courts by the problems faced fighting the civil war: suspended sentences alleviated pressures on the prison system; sending deserters to penal battalions maintained the numerical strength of the Red Army; seizing property and land reflected the realities of an economy with massive inflation, limited cash reserves and unwillingness to pay. Yet there was an increasing tendency by tribunals to sentence people to forced labour without imprisonment, which was seen as a means of rehabilitating people through socially-useful labour.
In practical terms, the importance of subjective factors across 1917 led to wide diversity across Russia that both governments struggled to contain. The tsarist government spent a great deal of time examining volost’ courts, seeking ways of defining particular local customs and when they should be applied, and frowning upon the frequent emphasis on the reputations and characters of individuals.​[35]​ Similarly, it did not take leading Bolsheviks long to realise that abandoning existing laws exacerbated diversity. New decrees, whilst numerous and wide-ranging, were vague and unsystematic, and rather than leading to a sharper break with the past and more satisfactory verdicts, the result was a period of varying, ineffective punishments for poorly defined and understood crimes. On 12 December 1919, the state published a basic aid, which provided guidance on the nature of criminal law, types of punishments, matters to consider when reaching a verdict, and other advice. Yet there were no definitions of specific crimes and much remained dependent on the interpretations of individual judges.​[36]​
Diversity became increasingly incompatible with Bolshevik concerns to strengthen central authority, whilst inconsistencies limited the ability of the legal system to project state power and regulate popular actions and beliefs. At a discussion on creating new law codes at the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Justice Officials on 28 June 1920, the representative from the Commissariat of Justice (Narkomiust) was exasperated that harmful crimes, like speculation, were punished by a small fine in one place and a prison sentence in another; ‘in the interests of the centralization of power’, he went on, ‘we must publish law codes’. Some attendees demurred, but as N. V. Krylenko, a prominent jurist and legal theorist, argued, it did not mean resurrecting old laws, but refining socialist legal consciousness, which should ‘not only mean the consciousness of one or another judge, but also the cumulative experience’ as expressed by particular norms.​[37]​ Lenin also argued in 1922 that law must be uniform and should not pander to ‘the long-standing Russian view and semi-barbarous habits that desire to preserve Kaluga law as distinct from Kazan law’. He too did not dismiss revolutionary consciousness, but argued that this consciousness required greater central control and oversight.​[38]​
This exasperation was exacerbated by changing political and economic conditions. With the political focus shifting from external threats to internal unrest, the NEP in March 1921 reintroduced elements of capitalism into the economy and many felt that the legal system had to change if it was to regulate and support the NEP effectively.​[39]​ At the 4th All-Russian Congress of Justice Officials on 26 January 1922, the Commissar of Justice, D. I. Kurskii, alluded to this and argued that Russia needed revolutionary legality (zakonnost’) based on written laws so that law could be understood by a wide mass of workers and peasants.​[40]​ This was not the first time that this term, legality, had been used, but it started to become used more systematically by 1922 as a means of contrasting with the consciousness (soznanie) that had dominated legal discourse since the first decree in 1917. Legality stood for order and uniformity, and thus an emphasis on statutory law, whilst consciousness reflected arbitrariness. Legality reflected the now stable position of the state, whilst consciousness reflected the improvisation of a state struggling to survive.​[41]​
A new criminal code was finally published on 1 June (a code covering procedure in criminal cases came into force on 1 July to ensure that these laws were enacted correctly and uniformly), codes on land and labour followed on 30 October, and a civil code on 31 October (with a code of procedure in civil cases on 7 July 1923).​[42]​ These codes were championed as revolutionary, cementing the role of law in a socialist state, but ‘significant’ similarities in the criminal code to tsarist codes have been noted, especially to those from 1903 and 1845, but even to the 1832 code.​[43]​ Similarly, much of the civil code was taken from a 1913 draft not implemented due to the outbreak of the First World War; even E. B. Pashukanis, a prominent legal theorist, admitted that it amounted to capitalist laws in a socialist state.​[44]​
Nevertheless, another theorist, whilst acknowledging the debt of the criminal code to previous codes, argued that it still had its source in the revolution.​[45]​ This is most evident in its emphasis on counter-revolutionary crimes. There had been a section dealing with political crimes in the 1903 codes,​[46]​ whilst the concept of justice being used for political objectives was well established before 1917, most obviously in the fight against revolution.​[47]​ The 1922 code, however, turned the precisely-defined crimes of the tsarist era into elastic descriptions that enabled most crimes to be politicized in a way that had not been possible before. People could also be convicted of acts that were not defined as crimes, but were analogous to acts that were, just in case future developments created new crimes. This elasticity was reinforced by lengthy sections on crimes against the order of governance, by officials and economic crimes, whilst the latter (and the terminology used throughout) made the class-based foundations of the new state clear. There remained a place for revolutionary consciousness with judges permitted to sentence within a range of punishments depending on circumstances and even demonstrate greater leniency in ‘exceptional circumstances’.​[48]​ 
That revolutionary consciousness still informed every verdict may have meant that the revolution had not been abandoned entirely, but it was now only supposed to operate within tightly prescribed boundaries. In practice, a much stronger mix of statutory and customary law continued to inform judicial decisions in the majority of local courts throughout the 1920s, just as it had done prior to 1917 and for much of the civil war. This was particularly true in rural areas where judges sought verdicts and sentences that made sense to them amid numerous laws and directives that they were often slow to hear about, and struggled to understand and remember. As a consequence, by the late 1920s, the Bolsheviks were forced to re-institutionalize the enduring, strong influence of customary law, creating a tiered system of local courts – people’s courts relying on written law and lay courts relying on custom – similar to the volost’ and circuit courts of tsarist Russia.​[49]​ In the end, the uneasy balance between statutory and customary law that had underpinned the tsarist legal system had largely been formally reconstituted by the 1920s, with far fewer revolutionary changes than had been intended. Stuchka had bemoaned in 1922 that law was the ‘strongest fortress’ and ‘best refuge’ for any obsolete ideology, but rather than overcoming this fortress, as he claimed, the Bolsheviks might better be seen as adapting it for their own ends.​[50]​

Becoming Citizens: People and the Courtroom

Revolutionary justice was not solely about the content and practice of law; equally important was how individuals engaged with and understood the legal system. To change Russia’s legal culture, the Bolsheviks intended to ensure that ordinary people were inseparable from the legal process, acting as judges, lawyers, witnesses, and spectators. In reality, as noted, most did not serve as judges, whilst those lawyers who cooperated with the new state steadily regained their pre-revolutionary, professionally-educated status.​[51]​ The scope for participation, then, remained traditional – as defendants, accusers, witnesses or spectators (either in person or learning about it later). This did not, however, lessen the importance of broader goals; Bolsheviks at all levels hoped that the ideology and practice of revolutionary justice would educate people in the behaviour, duties and mentalities expected of a conscientious citizen in the new soviet state.
The desire to educate was central to tribunals, for instance. From the start, officials sought to hold public meetings, attract broad audiences and publicize sentences in the press. By 1919-20, tribunals were holding travelling sessions that toured villages. A chairman of one tribunal described how the arrival of a session was a major event in remote locations. People arrived with negative preconceptions, initially reluctant to engage with the court as they lacked confidence in it. However, after watching it in action, they became convinced that the tribunal was securing their own interests by removing criminal elements and defending their rights, particularly once it became clear that even local officials were not above the law. People started to speak out and to bring their own cases. Although most were petty cases, in doing so, in the chairman’s words, people became citizens and the court became closer to the masses, bringing Bolshevik power and ideology to the localities.​[52]​ Even if one doubts the accuracy of this account, many officials expressed similar ambitions. One talked about the legal process as a ‘school’, whilst another believed courts enabled peasants to experience justice, not just read about it.​[53]​ This experience, yet another noted, strengthened their ‘moral consciousness’ and sense of duty to society.​[54]​ Beyond tribunals, the intervention of people’s courts into everyday lives – from domestic disputes and divorce to child support and other cases – would help the state to remake society.​[55]​
These aims were not new. Volost’ courts before 1917 aimed to provide a forum where peasants administered justice over other peasants, and acquired a link to the state beyond their obligations to pay taxes and provide service; they would act as citizens, participating in official organs and seeing them as a means of defending and enforcing rights.​[56]​ Similarly, the urban peace courts and jury service were to have the same effect.​[57]​ The extent to which this was achieved is questionable.​[58]​ On the one hand, Russians were using courts in increasing numbers in the years before the First World War meaning that they must have seen value in them, and were exposed to the legal process and its values. On the other hand, this did not necessarily make them citizens. Many people probably used courts as a last resort, whilst many peasants, for instance, went to courts to pursue traditional village conflicts or particular crimes, not trusting them to deal effectively with more serious conflicts. Courts also retained a strong element of traditional community justice through their unpredictability, whilst attempts by peace courts to marry statutory law with custom often only emphasized the differences between the two. Nevertheless, elements of law and the legal process were part of more and more people’s lives in late Imperial Russia, whether through going to court with cases, serving on juries, or simply reading about cases in newspapers or the ‘staggering popularity’ of crime fiction with the lower and middle classes.​[59]​ Thus, law had more potential to mould opinions and actions than it had ever enjoyed before in Russia’s history.
For revolutionary justice to succeed, it had to engage with people in similar ways, if not more comprehensively, but the turmoil of revolution and civil war made this difficult. It was not that people did not want to use courts (on the contrary, the revolution created new types of disputes), but that the collapse of state authority in 1917 rendered courts powerless and largely pointless, and the numbers using them fluctuated. As the Bolsheviks reconstituted state authority, however, statistics indicate an increasing caseload in courts, and the numbers of cases brought to people’s courts by the early 1920s had resumed the steady increase seen in comparable volost’ courts before 1917. In Moscow, for example, 104,428 cases were brought to people’s courts in 1918, of which 73% were criminal cases and 27% were civil cases.​[60]​ This number dropped to 93,035 in 1921 before rising steadily to 131,852 in 1924. By then, only 40% of cases were criminal cases, whereas 60% were civil cases. These trends – rising numbers of civil cases, falling numbers of criminal cases, but a steady growth in cases overall – were replicated across Moscow province, even if the balance remained in favour of criminal cases. In 1921, there had been 74,217 cases of which 76.5% were criminal. This fell slightly for two years before rising to 79,848 in 1924 but now only 65% were criminal.​[61]​ In the Ural region, civil cases were only 31% of the caseload in 1924 but had risen to 57% by 1927.​[62]​ 
The statistics on civil cases suggest that people were willingly using the legal system in increasing numbers by the 1920s, but the statistics on criminal cases mask many instances where people were compelled to engage with courts. People’s courts and tribunals expended vast amounts of time pursuing activities such as desertion, speculation and banditry (often resisting food requisitioning) that people saw as integral to survival during the civil war rather than as crimes. The legal system could still mould the actions and opinions of those compelled to go to court, but in a different way than those willingly involved.
Overall, it is as difficult to judge the impact of courts on people after 1917 as it was before. It has been noted, for example, that people respected the judgements of volost’ courts in the vast majority of cases prior to 1917 even if they lost, paying their fines and serving prison sentences.​[63]​ This respect broke down across the revolution as courts struggled to enforce their rulings; the authorities were particularly concerned with people’s courts dispensing fines as the majority of their sentences, which they believed were often not paid or could not be paid, and with people not fulfilling forced terms of community work.​[64]​
Otherwise, people’s voices tend only to be heard through appeals and complaints after 1917, both of which represent a specific, aggrieved segment of those participating in courts and both of which are phrased in ways that mask the writer’s true voice in favour of a voice that they hope the authorities will listen to, possibly by altering content, language or tone. Thus, even in tribunals, where justice was imposed on people, such sources do not reveal much outright opposition to revolutionary justice. To be sure, one defendant wrote angrily to VTsIK that Tambov’s tribunal was not a court but a ‘farce of a court, a profanation’. It had sentenced him to ten years forced labour for desertion (which he denied) despite, in his words, the fact that his trial marginalized lawyers and was guided by a hostile crowd of soldiers.​[65]​ Many probably had similar experiences (and not just in tribunals) and felt the same.​[66]​ Most appeals, however, suggest that people accepted the concept of counter-revolutionary crimes and the validity of tribunals to investigate them; they simply did not see their own actions as counter-revolutionary or criminal, or pleaded that circumstances had forced them to commit crimes and that the tribunal should be merciful.​[67]​ This in itself, though, suggests that the Bolsheviks’ core messages about what constituted a crime and counter-revolution had failed to be conveyed successfully.
Many appeals and complaints reveal some knowledge of legal procedure and recent laws. This may well have been obtained from others, but it still contributed to an individual’s legal consciousness. It has been suggested that legal knowledge enabled people to enjoy advantages in front of the court prior to 1917,​[68]​ but another study has pointed out that with respect to appeals the Bolsheviks usually ignored any arguments in favour of their own interpretation.​[69]​ This is true, but as there was no automatic right of appeal, procedural error or another violation had to be alleged in order to have the case reviewed, and the ability to articulate such errors did not do appellants any harm. Equally, although it could be argued that the mere fact that people were appealing sentences suggests some degree of confidence in the legal system, it could just as easily reflect desperation and routine.
Ultimately, courts had to dispense ‘justice’ in the eyes of the people for the latter to engage with and respect them. But what was seen as justice across a large and diverse country? Frierson argued that four criteria were central to how peasants defined crime in late Imperial Russia: personal harm, sin, premeditation, and membership of the offender or victim in the community.​[70]​ All these meant that an action could be a crime under certain circumstances, but not under others, and circumstances must be considered to obtain justice. These criteria did not disappear during the revolution, particularly personal harm and premeditation, even in relation to ‘new’ crimes. Initially, the state diverged from popular views. Would the state suffer, for instance, if its property was stolen or was it a crime that someone struggling to feed a family had bought and sold goods (speculated) to survive? Most thought not, but the Bolsheviks dispensed harsh sentences to reflect how damaging they felt these activities were during the civil war. Yet the massive scale of these crimes forced the authorities to change tack and urge courts to clarify motives and degrees of participation, and distinguish between crimes committed due to a desperate need to survive and ‘malignant’ (zlostnyi) or ‘selfish’ (korystnyi) crimes committed for personal gain, such as illegal brewing or large-scale speculation.​[71]​ Thus circumstances were restored to pre-eminence and, as noted, retained even after the 1922 criminal law code.
	Furthermore, revolutionary justice had to reach as many people as possible to be effective and the Bolsheviks were more proactive than their predecessors in this respect. As one official argued, attendance at trials was a more effective way of expanding the numbers exposed to the legal system than publishing sentences in the press, posting them on public buildings or distributing them to village soviets, although these were also useful.​[72]​ This was particularly important for tribunals; because they dealt with crimes of state importance, the Bolsheviks believed it was crucial that their activities and educational messages were spread as widely as possible. The travelling sessions mentioned above were seen as vital in this respect; not only did they reach remote areas, but people there were more receptive than in the towns served by the main tribunals. Tribunals were a novelty and a spectacle – an object of entertainment or curiosity – in a way that they were not in larger urban areas given pressures on workers’ time and alternative sources of entertainment. Lacking a permanent building, sessions used various spaces, sometimes the buildings of local authorities, but more commonly unofficial spaces; holding meetings in the public square or in local theatres or factories, or even railway stations and boats.​[73]​ Trials were therefore taking place where people worked and lived, encouraging attendance, even if only for short periods. Some trials were apparently seen by 5,000 people per day with some coming and going, whilst virtually entire villages turned up in other places.​[74]​
The trial was central to engagement, whether encouraging attendance or providing material for further dissemination. Judgements were all very well, but it was the drama of the trial that drew people into the court’s activities and it was the trial dialogue that offered the best means of educating people. The Bolsheviks were keen from the start to emphasize particular trials as examples of certain crimes that could be publicized widely and these laid the foundation for later infamous trials in the late 1920s and the 1930s. This practice was not new. The tsarist state had experimented with high-profile trials of revolutionaries since the 1860s, although the failure to convict Vera Zasulich in 1878 led to restrictions, leaving newspapers and official reports as the main means of dissemination.​[75]​ Even so, the trial of Mendel Beilis in 1913 was reported on by over a hundred newspapers, some of which printed the released transcripts verbatim to satisfy the demand for information.​[76]​ Similarly, local authorities had also been promoting the pedagogical functions of other prominent trials.​[77]​ Audiences, however, proved to be unpredictable, often sympathetic to Tsarism’s enemies even if they had committed crimes.
The Bolsheviks also faltered in their first high-profile trials,​[78]​ but they quickly adopted more effective control over them, utilizing trained lawyers to present their case, manipulating witnesses and evidence, and restricting the scope for the defendants to express their views and the audience to influence proceedings, whilst managing wider publicity. Lenin stressed that such ‘model’ (obraztsovyi) trials, which he defined as enacting fast and forceful repression with a clear explanation of their significance to the population, should be compulsory and tasked Narkomiust to organize them.​[79]​ It was just as important that, as one senior official noted, such trials dealt with everyday crimes of a mass character rather than just high-profile enemies, if not more important.​[80]​ Clearly local officials agreed, holding local ‘model’ trials, usually involving well-known local officials who had committed common crimes such as taking bribes, seizing property or exceeding their authority in some way. These trials often lasted for several days and gained extensive local newspaper coverage.​[81]​
For those not able to attend, the Bolsheviks re-staged trials, further breaking down the boundaries between education and entertainment. There was a history of fictional educational trials before 1917, from church trials of sinners to theatrical productions, and from 1919-20, they re-emerged as agitation trials. These were easy and cheap to organize. Some restaged real trials, others used fictional scenarios. The subjects ranged from obvious political enemies to harmful traits such as illiteracy and drunkenness. There were even trials of the Bolsheviks, proclaiming them innocent of accusations that the October Revolution lacked popular support. Many were improvised, but increasingly booklets were produced containing sample scripts, which could be adapted to reference local places and criminals. Trials encouraged audiences to participate, from shouting comments to voting on a verdict.​[82]​ Their ability to foster legal consciousness has been questioned since they were ultimately fictional morality tales with few elements of the legal apparatus.​[83]​ But this misses the point: they provided a recognizable image of the court, discussed the same issues and used similar terminology; some audiences became so involved that they expected the sentence to be enacted for real afterwards.
	In the 1920s, a new medium became available – film. Whilst newsreels from 1918 onwards had featured footage from trials, these were limited to shots of people and places, with subtitles briefly outlining accusations and verdicts. These increased awareness of trials, but did not really add much else. But by the mid-1920s, films were portraying fictional trials and were capable of much greater realism, including flashbacks to the scene of the crime, which moved the audience’s experience beyond anything possible in real or agitational trials. Scripts often covered social crimes, such as drunkenness, slacking or red tape, where harmful effects were stressed, confessions elicited, and repentance and reintegration achieved.​[84]​
	Alongside this, reading about crimes remained important. The boom in crime fiction prior to 1917 collapsed afterwards; shortages in paper combined with the state monopoly of publishing and the belief that such stories lacked political value, highlighting as they did divisions and social conflict.​[85]​ Despite a mini-revival in the 1920s when some prominent Bolsheviks felt that crime novels could be a means of engaging people with revolutionary adventures and heroes, the general opposition persisted.​[86]​ Similarly, mainstream crimes were rarely reported in the press. ‘Political’ crime, from political opponents to official corruption, was worth reporting, but whereas coverage had mixed fact, education and entertainment prior to 1917, the first two now took over. National newspapers such as Izvestiia and Pravda covered major trials, whilst provincial newspapers printed regular updates. The appearance of travelling sessions of tribunals often prompted a flurry of coverage in district (uezd) newspapers, further extending their impact. Nevertheless, legal officials complained throughout the civil war that courts never received as much press coverage as they should, urging courts to provide the press with more information and to appoint officials with specific responsibilities in this area.




This study has focused on two broad elements of Russia’s legal culture over the revolutionary divide, but other case studies would reveal similar findings; if nothing else, the Bolsheviks’ ambitions, which developed steadily after October 1917, to rule through the law rather than be subjected to it, and to use law to enhance the authority and efficiency of government, were the same as tsarist intentions. To be sure, the ambitious nature of early Bolshevik attempts to dismantle the tsarist legal system meant that some elements of lasting change were inevitable. It was impossible, however, to build a new legal system with comparable objectives to foster state control, social order and citizenship without resulting in similarities with the previous system. And, underneath this, enduring popular conceptions of law and justice were not going to change overnight, despite the revolutionary turmoil. In this sense, revolutionary justice did not succeed in revolutionizing Russia’s legal culture. By the end of the civil war, the initial aim to re-forge the relationship between law and the state, and how people understood and interacted with the law, had coalesced into the prosaic ambition to cement central state control over justice so as to use law most effectively in the interests of the state. The mix of old and new laws, the enduring uneasy balance between statutory and customary laws, and the difficulties of engaging people with the legal system in the desired manner and with the intended results, meant that revolutionary justice in its entirety, as envisaged by legal theorists, was never entirely successful. In the end, the Bolsheviks found that a new legal culture could not be easily imposed on to a population.
	Elements of continuity were, therefore, forced on the Bolsheviks by the circumstances of civil war, but it was also a conscious choice, especially with regards to the law codes and the legal apparatus. On the one hand, the legal theorists who led Narkomiust had all been trained as lawyers under Tsarism; it was inevitable that they would search for solutions amid familiar laws, institutions and practices. On the other hand, local justice officials shared more with the people brought in front of the court, and popular conceptions of law and justice, than they did with Narkomiust, making the continuation of custom inevitable, even if renamed as revolutionary consciousness.
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